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CHAPTER 1
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
The discipline of international relations’ theory emerged after the WWI, as it was then called, the 
Great War, when the need of a discipline to reveal the causes of war and the conditions of lasting peace 
has risen. The establishment of the first common International Relations Institute first came up as a 
British-American initiative at the 1919 Paris Conference. The discipline, therefore, was essentially 
born with a crisis-explaining and -solving purpose at the beginning of the 20th century, however, its 
roots and antecedents can be found in political philosophy, international law, as well as in diplomatic 
and political history.1
It is crucial to emphasize that the discipline of international relations does not have a unified 
theory, it rather consists of arguing and competing theories, some of which may become dominant 
over certain periods. The fundamental difference between the main theoretical trends of international 
relations lies in how they see the international system, what they consider to be its central actor and 
what motivational factors are important related to the behavior of actors in international relations. The 
traditional theories of international relations include liberalism, realism, neoliberal institutionalism 
and neorealism while critical theories comprise constructivism, Marxism and feminism – just to 
mention the most important ones. This chapter aims to present the above theories.
1.1 TradiTional Theories of inTernaTional relaTions
1.1.1. The LiberaL Trend of inTernaTionaL PoLiTicaL Theory
The first significant paradigm of international relations is liberalism or idealism which became the 
defining theory of the discipline after WWI and many of its theses derived from the shock of the war 
and aiming at defining the conditions of lasting peace in international relations.
The theory was strongly influenced by liberal internationalism, originated from the war winner 
Anglo-Saxon countries, which saw the pledge of enduring peace in the transposition of the institutions 
and mechanisms of liberal democracy into the international system. This was represented by one of the 
most well-known advocates of liberalism, Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States who 
proposed – as one of his 14 points announced in January 1918 –, the establishment of the League of 
Nations whose main purpose was to ensure lasting alliance and cooperation between states.
Within the liberal trend of international political theory three central concepts emerged based on 
the work of John Locke and Immanuel Kant on the behavior and foreign policy of states, especially that 
of liberal democracies:
 – the theory of liberal or democratic peace: Kant laid the foundations of the concept in his work 
entitled “Perpetual Peace”, which were improved by many in the 20th century – e.g. Michael 
Doyle. According to Kant’s basic concept, the natural condition between states is war, thus peace, 
especially lasting peace, must be created. He mentions the republican constitutional system and 
the democratic exercise of power, the (peace) alliance of states with these characteristics, and 
the evolution and emergence of world law and cosmopolitan law (essentially international law) 
1 Bayer 2001, 291-293.
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as conditions of achieving lasting peace. Following the Cold War, the theory of democratic 
peace based on the Kantian philosophy was having its renaissance, claiming that democratic 
states rarely engage in war with each other, thus the key to lasting peace is the democratic 
transformation and democratization of the countries of the world. Many politicians have chosen 
this concept to support their foreign policies, among which we shall highlight the American 
efforts to export a Western-type democracy (by Bill Clinton or George W. Bush). One of the 
reasons why democracies engage less in war with each other stems from the typical institutional 
and normative constraints of democracies, the most important element being the accountability 
of governments towards their voters. Since the voters bear all the costs and losses (financial 
expenditures and human life) of a possible war, it is less common that the majority would support 
starting a war. Another explanation is found in democratic political culture according to which 
democracies prefer peaceful, intrastate and orderly conflict management solutions among each 
other.2
 – the imprudent aggression and tendency for intervention of liberal democracies towards illiberal 
democracies: the essence of the idea first articulated by David Hume is that while the relationship 
between democracies is characterized by lasting peace, democracies regularly engage in war 
with non-democratic states, what’s more, not with defensive aims. The main reasons behind 
carelessness and imprudence are mostly the inadequate assessment of profits and losses of war, as 
well as the increasing distrust and misunderstanding between the states. Furthermore, we cannot 
ignore the interest-driven and typically expansive (not primarily in territorial but in ideological 
sense) motivations of democracies in connection with the war against non-democratic regimes. 
As László Kiss J. points out, the United States intervened in Third World countries between 1946 
and 1976 more than twice as many times as the USSR did.3
 – the excessive, sometimes even indifferent leniency of liberal democracies against danger 
and aggressors: the leniency and indifference formulated by Hume can basically take two forms, 
in the lack of support of the allies (for example the refusal of liberal democracies to support 
the republican forces in the Spanish civil war), on the one hand; or, on the other, in the lack of 
actions against the aggressor (see the policy against Mussolini and Hitler). While the imprudent 
aggression towards non-democratic systems is a feature of liberal democracies in hegemonic, 
great power status, the leniency is rather a particular foreign policy behavior of states with 
isolationist foreign policy (e.g. the United States between the world wars) or that of democracies 
with declining power (e.g. France and Great Britain after WWI).4
Critics of the Concept of Democratic Peace
The essence of the concept of democratic peace is that the greater the scale of political 
participation within a society, the less the violence within the society and in the external 
relations of the country. However, practical experiences only partially justify the concept. 
In democratic countries, the domestic use of force is smaller than in dictatorial regimes, 
and it is also true that democracies in their relations with each other are more peaceful. 
However, democratic states often engage in war with non-democracies – and not just 
in self-defence. Especially the young, yet unconsolidated democracies tend to be more 
aggressive.
Source: Kiss J. 2009, 295.
Liberalism, like classical realism, takes an anthropological approach to state behavior, i.e. it deduces 
it from human nature. However, contrary to realism, liberalism considers human nature fundamentally 
2 Kőváriné ignáth 2-4.
3 Kiss J. 2009, 294-295.
4 Kiss J. 2009, 298-300.
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good, human beings rational, teachable and cooperative. Consequently, long-term cooperation between 
states and the elimination of war from international relations is also possible for liberals. Thus, 
international politics is not a zero-sum game – as the realist trend of international political theory states 
– in which a state can only acquire more power if it takes it from another state, but rather a positive-sum 
game in which all actors win due to their cooperation.
For liberals, however, the state is not the only significant actor of international relations. The 
individual also emerges as a formative of international relations, while the examination of public 
opinion is also relevant to liberal foreign policy analysis. For liberals, individuals capable of acting 
in the international system are primarily the members of political or foreign policy elite who can 
influence and shape international politics, depending on certain external circumstances as well as their 
personal characteristics and habits. According to Karen A. Mingst, the following external factors shall 
be highlighted that have a positive impact on the individual actions of political leaders:
 – in case of the instability of new political institutions, or the crisis of existing political institutions 
and of economy, political leaders can have a strong impact on state foreign policy and thus 
on international politics as well. George Washington in the United States, Mahatma Gandhi in 
India, Václav Havel in the Czech Republic all managed to have a great personal influence on 
the foreign policy of their state because the political institutional system and procedures had not 
yet been sufficiently consolidated. The impact of Mikhail Gorbachev could become so emphatic 
because of the economic and political crisis of the USSR.
 – the lack of institutional and social control and accountability in non-democratic regimes also 
favors dictators in shaping their foreign policy without constraints.
 – an atypical situation, a crisis or a less central, more specific topic, where well-established 
institutions and procedures cannot be applied or where there is insufficient and confusing 
information, also increases the personal influence of a political leader on foreign policy. For 
instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the factors inherent in John F. Kennedy’s personality 
(e.g. openness to various alternatives) largely contributed to the peaceful resolution of the crisis.5
Apart from political leaders and members of the political elite, private individuals can also play 
an important role in international relations who might end up in a position of influence primarily by 
circumstance, particularity, knowledge or means. See the impacts on international affairs of Bill Gates 
and his wife through spreading vaccines and supporting AIDS programs,6 George Soros through his 
Open Society Foundation, and Lady Diana through programs against landmines.
Background Diplomacy
The essence of background diplomacy is to invoke persons outside of the government 
to help resolve conflicts, which might be successful. One of the examples of high-level 
background diplomacy is the series of informal meetings terminating the conflicts 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea which became independent from Ethiopia. These meetings 
were mediated by Jimmy Carter, former President of the Untied States and the Carter 
Center’s International Negotiation Network.
Another example of background diplomacy was provided by Armand Hammer, American 
businessman who mediated between the USA and the USSR in the years of the Cold War 
through his communication channels based on his business interests and friendships in 
the USSR. After the catastrophic Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, he could convince 
Mikhail Gorbachev to accept the assistance of American doctors and experts.
Source: Mingst, 2011, 166-167.
5 Mingst 2011, 155-156.
6 Mingst 2011, 166.
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1.1.2. reaLisT aPProaches of inTernaTionaL reLaTions
The theses of the realist theory of international relations are rooted in Thucydides’ historiography and in 
the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, while modern realism emerged 
after the Second World War out of disappointment in liberalism and became the dominant trend within 
the discipline for a time. As László Kiss J. notes “[…] for most laymen, but for a considerable part of 
experts and politicians, it is still such a starting point, which serves as the most convincing explanation 
for the operation of international politics […]”.7
The realist trend of international political theory is not a unified trend either. Hans Joachim Morgenthau 
is usually mentioned as the father of the so-called classical realism of the post-WWII period, who laid down 
the foundations of classical realism in his elementary 1948 work Politics among Nations. From the 1970s, 
many trends of neorealism emerged, among which Kenneth Waltz represents structural realism (Theory of 
International Politics – 1979), while John Gilpin and Robert Modelski represent economic realism.
Classical realism, the first in chronological order, laid down some of the foundations of realism 
that were also recognized by the representatives of later trends. These can be summarized as follows:
 – the international system is characterized by anarchy, i.e. there is no supranational entity in the 
international system that would have the monopoly of use of force and could make states follow 
the rules, thus guaranteeing security. Several concepts central to realism arise from the above 
thesis. One of them is the notion of self-help, meaning that primarily the countries themselves 
are to maintain and maximize their own security. During this they are faced with the so-called 
security dilemma, i.e. the choice between two available alternatives:
1. either to start arming up in order to maximize their security and thus trigger the concern of 
other states, spurring them to arm up, thus launching an armament spiral and increasing 
the risk of armed conflicts;
2. or to give up on the acquisition of weapons and equipment expected to ensure their 
security, thus becoming more vulnerable to aggression.
 – the point of international politics is the fight for power: this assertion is closely linked to the 
previous one, since states shall deal with the anarchic international system themselves, thus the 
more power they have, the safer they can feel.
 – the most important actors of the international system are the states (statism): although realists do 
not deny the raison d’être of other, non-state actors, they definitely consider the states the central 
actors of international relations.
 – the functional similarity of states: states should be considered homogenous, functionally 
identical actors of the international system that try to maximize their profit and power, in their 
international interactions, regardless of their territory, population, economic and military power.
 – the role of morality is marginal in international relations: states and their leaders are not bound 
by universal ethical, moral norms or commands, thus states do not have be fair in dealing with 
each other, according to realists. The most important thing for the state is to guarantee its own 
existence and security during which essentially any instrument is allowed.
Classical realism is characterized by an anthropological approach regarding the fundamental 
motives and behavior of states, for it traces back its origins to the essentially negative human nature. 
Since the most important features of human nature are egoism and the unwavering desire for power 
(animus dominandi), conflicts between human beings are inevitable.8 Thus, this explains, through 
tracing state behavior back to human nature, that – for realists – armed conflicts between states and 
wars are inherent in international politics and whose elimination is an impossible mission.
7 Kiss J. 2009, 220.
8 Kiss J. 2009, 226.
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Structural neoliberalism diverts from the anthropological approach of classical realism. According 
to Kenneth Waltz, its best-known representative, not human nature, rather the international system 
determines the interactions of states, thus if we want to understand international politics, we shall 
focus on the international system (system-level analysis).9
According to the neorealist view, states’ interactions are basically defined by the distribution of 
power in the international system. A state’s position of power is determined, on the one hand, by the 
extent of benefits from resources available in the international system and on the other hand, by the 
polarisation of the international system. 10 The polarization of the international system influences the 
states’ positions of power by that the number of polarizing great powers in the system determines the 
course of action and ability to maneuver for each state.11
From the point of view of power poles, we can talk about uni-, bi- and multipolar international 
systems. Unipolar international system can usually occur by the dominance of an imperial size great 
power (e.g. the system established and ruled by the Roman Empire in antiquity), which does its best 
endeavours to monopolise military and economic power and is able and willing to maintain order in 
the international system, punishing the offender countries. The bipolar international system is based 
on two polarising great powers of almost equal weight which basically determine the positions and 
interactions of states within the international system. An important feature of the bipolar international 
system is the tight ideological bound of countries belonging to the same side which means a serious 
cohesion force between them (see the ideological bounds of the Eastern and Western bloc countries 
in the decades of the Cold War). Finally, in the multipolar international system (e.g. the current 
international system) it emerges more than two power blocks among which the competition is much 
less tense than in the bipolar system, especially due to the lack of tight ideological bound, however 
which factor in the same time results less cohesion within each block.12
In the same time, the international system’s number of poles not only determines states’ position of 
power, but it is also the determinant of stability and instability of the international system. However, 
there is a dispute among Neorealists about which international system is considered more stable. 
According to Waltz, the bipolar system is considered the most stable structure in the long term because 
both parties can counterbalance and mitigate the violent aspirations of the other, thus preventing the 
system’s destabilization. In a bipolar system, the two poles are clearly and unequivocally separated, 
it is knowable from each state to which pole is linked or rather is not linked to either. The leading 
powers of both poles can act almost exclusively watching the other and try to calculate the other’s 
actions or possible responses. By maintaining balance of power, thus the parties strive to protect 
themselves and the bipolar international system. John Mearsheimer also argued for the stability of the 
bipolar system and said that by the end of the Cold War, the international system would lose its former 
stability and predictability, the number of conflicts and thus the chance of wars rockets. Regulation/
control of multipolar systems is theoretically easier than the bipolar system’s. There are many relations 
and interactions between the political units which reduce the extent of hostility but also make the 
establishment of long-lasting and high-level cohesive alliance harder. The supporters of the unipolar 
system (for instance Paul Kennedy, Robert O. Keohane) often argue that this is the most manageable 
and thus the most stable system, since the hegemonic power has the will to pay, even unilaterally, but 
to enforce the norms regulating the international system, if it is necessary to maintain the system. And 
when the power of the hegemon starts to decrease, the stability of the system also wavers.13
9 WalTz 1979, 65.
10 Kiss J. 2009, 235-236.
11 Kiss J. 2009, 241.
12 EgEdy 2007, 53-57.
13 Mingst 2011, 99-101.
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The Theory of Balance of Power
The theory of balance of power is an approach derived from the anarchic nature of 
the international system, meaning that in the anarchic international environment, any 
state can resort to violence in the interests of its foreign policy and of maximising its 
power. Hence, the most likely reaction of other states will be to prevent – if necessary 
by cooperating with each other – the given state’s power-maximalisation and hegemonic 
aspirations. The system of balance of power presupposes the existence of two or more 
great powers capable of controlling and counterbalancing each other’s power.
The representatives of realism and neorealism distinguish two crucial obstacles of inter-state 
cooperation, on the one hand the fear of cheating, i.e. the fear that the other state in the cooperation 
breaks the cooperation, on the other hand the problem of relative profit.14 Since the principal purpose 
of state is not to maximize its own absolute profit, as later discussed liberal institutionalism says, but to 
ensure its position in the anarchic international system and by this its survival,15 therefore the state does 
its best endeavors to prevent the relative profit deriving from the other states’ cooperation.
Realism has often been criticized for the fact that besides ‘high politics’ (which essentially means 
military security) does not pay enough attention to economic processes in course of interpreting 
international relations. Economic realism fills this hiatus in the realist approach of international 
political theory, its emergence was closely related to the discourse on the relative decline of the United 
States’ power and its impact on the international system in the 1970s and 1980s. Besides military 
security and its most threatening rival, the USSR, economic realists regarded economic processes to be 
of central significance, stressing that for the United States Japan is – in economic terms – such a serious 
competitor as is the USSR in military terms.
Robert Gilpin explained the decline of the United States with the hegemonic cyclicity theory, 
according to which each hegemony is necessarily ephemeral in international relations on the one hand 
because their running expenses increase faster than the resources available to them, and on the other 
hand, because none of the leading states can prevent the spread of their economic knowledge and 
technologies in the world.16
The Theory of International Public Goods
The theory of international public goods is closely related to the concept of hegemony 
cycles. Its starting point is that as the state has to provide national public goods 
(infrastructure, legal certainty, public safety), the operability of the international system 
also requires a hegemonic power undertaking to guarantee the availability of international 
public goods (international financial, economic system, international security, freedom 
of trade). This is not done, however, by the hegemon out of selflessness but because it 
benefits the most this way from the existing international system. Other states typically 
accept the situation because they can take part in international relations like a free rider, 
without contributing to the maintenance of the international system. This happened 
essentially after 1945, when the United States played a hegemonic role regarding the 
West through constructing and maintaining the Bretton Woods system of monetary 
management and in assuring security.
Source: Kiss J. 2003, 26.
14 griEco 1988, 487.
15 WalTz 1979, 126.
16 galló 2000, 64.
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1.1.3. The fundamenTs of neoLiberaL insTiTuTionaLism
The neoliberal institutionalism that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, besides that it agrees realist, 
neorealist approaches that the international system has anarchic nature and that the central actor of 
international relations is the state, it put interdependence, international institutions and long-term 
cooperation into the focus of its analysis.
The economic interdependence of states was placed at the center of analysis by the oil crises of the 
1970s and the crisis of Bretton Woods system of monetary management based on the convertibility of 
gold-dollar, while the security policy interdependence is linked to the development of intercontinental 
missiles and the relativization of geographical distances.17 These events shed light on that global and 
regional economic or rather political crises can have many unforeseeable consequences for the majority 
of countries, as effect of globalization cross-border, economic, financial and political processes have 
started which shaped interdependence among states.
In their complex interdependence theory, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye posit that 
interdependence always has costs as it limits the autonomy of the state and requires adequate resources for 
adaptation. Depending on the scale of costs, we can talk about states’ sensitivity (to) interdependence 
and vulnerability (to) interdependence. In the first case, additional costs are incurred for the state 
when it reacts to a change in another country, but it is unnecessary to take countermeasures or modify 
the affected policy. In contrast, in the case of vulnerability interdependence, the costs of the state are 
so excessive that it shall take political countermeasures, or if is unable to do so or unsuccessful, then it 
might find itself in a critical situation (e.g., a country in need of import is either able to manage the rise 
of the world market price of crude oil or it has to change its energy policy by modifying oil-pricing or 
by providing alternative energy resources).18
Referring to interdependence, neoliberals assert that the long-term cooperation between states 
is not only possible (as classic liberalism claims), but it is necessary for countries to regain control 
over cross-border economic, political, social processes. The framework of long-term cooperation 
consists of international institutions, in other words regimes which on the one hand reduce the 
costs of cooperation between states through permanent structures and procedures; on the other hand, 
they can increase the bargaining power of weaker and smaller states. It is important to note that the 
term ‘regime’ used in international relations’ theory is not the same as in political sciences, which 
indicates the different political systems. The regime-concept of international political theory means 
all international institutions which serve as a framework for long-term cooperation between states 
and thus also become actors that shape international relations (although neoliberal institutionalists 
are not unified in dealing with international institutions as autonomous actors or merely as tools of 
states). International institutions, regimes include not only international organizations with permanent 
structures and competences but also rules of international law, international agreements and judicial 
fora, conferences and congresses.
1.2. altErnativE, critical thEoriEs of intErnational rElations
Over the last two or three decades, numerous new alternative theories were born within international 
relations’ theory, which have a strong criticism of the principles of traditional trends in common. The 
fact that the traditional theories were not able to predict and explain the collapse of the USSR (and 
17 Kiss J. 2009, 305.
18 Kiss J. 2009, 307-308.
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with this the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order) largely contributed to the spread and 
strengthening of alternative theories.
1.2.1. The (sociaL) consTrucTivisT Trend of inTernaTionaL PoLiTicaL Theory
Constructivist authors acknowledge and consider the facts of the social world, besides the facts 
objectively given by the natural world, saying that these are created, i.e. constituted by ideas, values, 
norms, theories accepted by individuals and by agreements based on these facts. The social world 
and some of its phenomena, institutions, concepts and within them the basic assumptions related to 
international relations – such as anarchic characteristics of international environment, security dilemma, 
clash of civilizations or state interest – are existing phenomena, therefore not objectively given but 
socially constructed, so they can be changed. Therefore, constructivism breaks with the deterministic 
(thus narrow) interpretation of international relations.
The notion ‘socially constructed’ also refers to the fact that the objects of our knowledge are 
not independent of our interpretation and language, i.e. we attribute a different collective meaning 
to the material world around us.19 The act of a Muslim suicide terrorist, for instance, is a seriously 
reprehensible act committed against life according to Western values, while, in the Muslim world, this 
is a self-sacrificing behavior, what’s more requirement, in the spirit of Jihad.
Consequently, according to constructivists, the state’s behavior and interests are not determined by 
the power or its distribution in the international system, but by the persuasions, identities and social 
norms of the given political community. One of the best-known representatives of constructivism, 
Alexander Wendt recognizes that in the international relations’ theory states compose the most 
important unit of analysis, but the relations between states are not created by objective factors (such 
as the anarchic nature of the international system) but they are socially constructed, therefore they are 
constantly changing.20
Although, for constructivists, power is not a central notion, they deal with its nature and significance. 
However, while realist trends and neoliberal institutionalism use ‘power’ primarily in a material sense 
(military, economic, political), constructivists rather talk about immaterial power, rooted in ideas, 
culture or language. 21
Similarly to neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism also addresses the role of norms, highlighting 
their central importance. However, we should distinguish between regulatory norms and constitutive 
norms. As a matter of fact, neoliberals recognize norms as purely regulatory, saying that norms/regimes 
regulate the behavior of states and facilitate their cooperation by promising different advantages. 
Conversely, constructivism talks about constitutive norms which not only regulate the behavior of 
states, but they are the determinants thereof through the definition of state identity and state-interest.22
The trend’s central questions are how the norms are established and how do the norms determine 
and influence the behavior of states and non-state actors. The stage model can answer to these questions 
which differentiates three phases of norms’ life-cycle: emergence, cascade and internalization. In 
the phase of the emergence, birth of the norm, the central actors are the so-called norm-activists, i.e. 
for example human rights or environmentalist groups and NGOs seeking to influence governments, 
politicians and parliaments with the help of, among others, mass-communication to reach and protect 
19 Kiss J. 2009, 359.
20 Kiss J. 2003, 62.
21 Mingst 2011, 86.
22 Kiss J. 2003, 61.
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important values, objectives. At the same time, norm-activists seek the support of the broadest masses 
of society through campaigns, demonstrations, various actions. In case they can convince the critical 
mass of states to appreciate the importance of a given norm, then we move to the second phase of 
the norm cycle, cascade, where the central actors are no longer the norm-activists, but the so-called 
normative leading states or rather international organizations (in many cases the UN or its specialized 
agencies), which can have an indirect or direct pressure on other states in order to adapt the given norm. 
For example, the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the international agreements 
containing the given norm play an important role in dissemination of norms. Finally, the third phase 
of the life cycle of norms is their internalization, in which state bureaucracies, competent experts and 
lawyers have a central role tasked with shaping state institutions, procedures and society according to 
the given norm. 23
1.2.2. The radicaL Theories of inTernaTionaL reLaTions: marxism and neomarxism, Theories 
of The worLd-sysTem and worLd-socieTy
Radical theories of international political theory are usually based on Marxist foundations. Marxist 
and Neo-Marxist authors, in their analyses, principally emphasize economic inequalities and the 
unilateral dependence of undeveloped countries from developed ones. The essence of their materialist 
approach to history is that historical turning points can be interpreted essentially as responses to 
economic processes and the changes in international relations are of economic origins as well.
The world-system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein is also based on Marxist foundations. Its point 
of departure is that the analysis of international relations should not originated from nation-states, but 
from world-system, this must be the basic unit of international relations. Historically, he differentiated 
two forms of the world-system based on the way of decision-making on resource allocation: world 
empire and world economy. A centralized organization allocates resources among the respective actors 
in the world empire, while in world economy there is no centralized political actor, but numerous power 
centers compete for the resources.24
World economy essentially started to emerge after the Age of Discovery and started to become 
structured due to the unequal distribution of resources – a feature of capitalism. Thus the groups of core 
countries, periphery and semi-periphery countries have been created. Core countries are developed ones, 
characterized by international capital concentrating here, they possess the most advanced economy and 
technology. The countries of the periphery are the poor, developing (third world) countries which have 
difficulties engaging in global economic processes due to the lack of adequate capital, technology 
and highly qualified workforce, typically being exposed to core countries. The semi-periphery is the 
in-between category, in which countries also depend on the core – although not to such a great extent.
The advantage of economic development is also reflected in political power relations, as the world-
system, i.e. the world economy encompasses the interstate political system (international system), 
which is thus characterized by unequal power relations and action possibilities, in which the element 
of national sovereignty formally relevant to every state essentially correlates to the different degrees to 
which states are limited.25
One of the best-known authors of the world-society theory, John W. Burton who broke with the 
concept of a state-centered international system based primarily on the process of globalization and 
23 Kiss J. 2003, 64-65.
24 EgEdy 2007, 40.
25 galló 2000, 114-115.
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in this context on the so-called multiplication of non-state actors. He describes the emergence of a 
spider-web-like world-society in his book ‘World Society’.
The functionally interconnected transnational, i.e. cross-border systems (economy, science, culture, 
sport, certain groups of people or individuals, etc.) are – as a result of globalization – directly linked to 
each other permanently, primarily due to modern communication technologies and easier and cheaper 
travel and transportation.26 These transnational networks, alongside intergovernmental relations, are 
also architects of international politics and members of the world-society in which power loses its former 
significance and communication becomes the principal organizing force of international processes. In 
this system states do not disappear but their borders blur, lose part of their former significance.27
1.2.3. The feminisT Trend of inTernaTionaL PoLiTicaL Theory
Like all feminist scientific trends, the feminist approach of international relations is also very closely 
linked to the second wave-feminism of the 1960-70s. Many feminists, however, originate their interest 
in international relations from the peace movements of the Cold War. In 1988, Millenium was the 
first journal dealing with international relations that dedicated a special issue to the topic of women 
and international relations. In that issue, Fred Halliday stated that the exclusion of women and their 
experiences from the discipline led to a partial, masculine interpretation of international relations 
despite the dominant theories claiming that they explain the reality of world politics. 28
The end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order gave a serious boost to the theory, because the 
traditional approaches failed to predict and explain the end of the bipolar world order. The International 
Feminist Journal of Politics launched in 1999 specifically intended to serve as a permanent forum for 
the feminist approach in international relations and politics, to ensure a platform for the representatives 
of the trend in addition to the columns of special issues. 29
The most important theses and criticisms of feminism can be summarized as follows:
 – it approaches “making women more visible”30 – i.e. the detection and elimination of 
discrimination, abuse, political and economic under-representation of women – as a moral 
obligation;
 – it distinguishes between sex and gender, stating that the latter consists of socially constructed 
stereotypes and roles that have an impact on the states’ foreign policy and international politics, 
making them state- and sovereignty-centered, and power- and war-centered;31
 – realists overestimate the importance of states in international relations, without paying attention 
to political and social relations within the states which, feminists claim, are determinants of 
state foreign policy. The lack of attention paid to individuals (not members of the political elite, 
but ordinary persons) is mentioned as another important hiatus, because for realists security 
almost exclusively means the security of the state, while for feminists it refers to the security of 
individuals, i.e. human security.
26 feJes 2012, 22.
27 galló 2000, 75-76.
28 Cited by True 2017, 3.




Women in Post-Armed-Conflict Situations; Women and Peacekeeping from a Feminist Perspective
As feminist international relations experts have pointed out: violence against women 
(sexual or domestic violence, forced prostitution) not only continues but occasionally 
increases in post-conflict periods – when the reorganisation and assurance of state 
functions (including state monopoly of violence, re-establishment of public safety and 
public services) is usually done by peacekeeping troops. One of the reasons for this is 
that peace between the former combatants and the assurance of public safety are primary 
considerations for the peacekeepers and thus the various forms of violence against 
women get lost in the uncertain security environment.
Another aspect of the situation of women in post-conflict periods is that women are 
typically excluded from power positions and thus from political decision-making 
processes, as well as from access to economic and social resources (workplace, education, 
elementary food, housing).
Finally, women’s participation in peacekeeping operations is extremely under-represented. 
In 1993, women composed just 1 percent of the deployed military peacekeepers and by 
2014 their ratio only increased to 3 percent.
Source: smiTh 2018
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security targeted 
remedying the above issues, encouraging the MS – among others – to ensure greater 
representation of women at all decision-making levels, in national, regional and 
international institutions and in the field of conflict prevention, management and 
resolution. The document also encourages the Secretary General to prepare a study on 
the impact of armed conflicts on women and children and the role of women in peace-
building as well as on the different roles of gender in peace processes.
Source: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)
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QUESTIONS FOR SELF-CHECK
1. When was the birth of the discipline of international relations’ theory and the beginning of its 
institutionalization?
2. What do we mean by the concept of liberal or democratic peace?
3. What are the external factors increasing the influence of individuals (mainly political leaders) and 
their ability to act in international politics?
4. Enumerate the fundamental theses of realism.
5. What types of international systems can be distinguished from the point of view of power poles?
6. What do we mean by interdependence?
7. What are international regimes and what is their function in international relations?
8. What role does constructivism attribute to norms?
9. Briefly summarize the World-system Theory.
10. Describe the important theses of the feminist theory of international relations.
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